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THE DISCRETIONARY POWER TO GRANT ADDITIONAL
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES IN HIGHLY PUBLICIZED
CRIMINAL TRIALS: SECURING A FAIR AND
IMPARTIAL TRIAL
INTRODUCTION

The New York Court of Appeals has stated that "[t]he matter of
peremptory challenge rests entirely with the Legislature."' Section
270.25 of the Criminal Procedure Law is the present statement of
legislative policy on the matter of peremptory challenges.&2 This section prescribes both the number of peremptory challenges available
to the parties in a criminal trial, and the manner in which these challenges must be exercised.2 CPL 270.25 neither expressly nor implicitly
,gives a trial-court judge the authority to grant additional peremptory
challenges to criminal defendants. However, recent judicial interpretation of this statute indicates that trial-court judges may, at their
-discretion, increase the number of peremptory challenges available to
defendants under CPL 270.25. 4 It is the purpose of this Comment to
analyze the possible rationale behind this expansionary trend and to
'support its continuation.
1. People v. Doran, 246 N.Y. 409, 426, 159 N.E. 379, 385 (1927)

(citations

-omitted).
2. N.Y. CGum. PRo. LAw § 270.25 (McKinney 1971) [hereinafter cited and referred to in the text as CPL 270.25].
3. CPL 270.25 reads in full:
1. A peremptory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for which no
reason need be assigned. Upon any peremptory challenge, the court must
exclude the person challenged from service.
2. Each party must be allowed the following number of peremptory challenges:
(a) Twenty for regular jurors if the highest crime charged is a Class A
felony, and two for each alternate juror to be selected.
(b) Fifteen for the regular juror if the highest crime charged is a Class
B or Glass C felony, and two for each alternate juror to be selected.
(c) Ten for the regular jurors in all other cases, and two for each alternate
juror to be selected.
3. When two or more defendants are tried jointly, the number of peremptory
challenges prescribed in subdivision two is not multiplied by the number of
defendants, but such defendants are to be treated as a single party. In any
such case, a peremptory challenge by one or more defendants must be
allowed if a majority of the defendants join in such challenge. Otherwise,
it must be disallowed.
4. See State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 324 N.E.2d 351, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as King].
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GENESIS OF STATE V. KING

The seminal case supporting the grant of additional peremptory
challenges to criminal defendants is State v. King.5 The King proceeding was initiated during jury selection in People v. Hill & Pernasilice&
in order to prohibit supreme court Justice Gilbert King from exceeding his statutory authority.
The underlying trial involved John Hill and Charles Pernasilice,
who were among those former inmates of the State Correctional
Facility in Attica, New York, involved in the Attica prisoner rebellion
of September, 1971. 7 Hill and Pernasilice were charged by a single
indictment with the murder of William Quinn, a prison guard who
was killed during the siege. 8
In 1974, John Hill, as representative party in a multidefendant
motion, secured a change of venue, due in part to the limited facilities
and lack of qualified veniremen in Wyoming County. The underlying Attica indictments were transferred to the Supreme Court of
Erie County in Buffalo, New York.10
With supreme court Justice King presiding, jury selection in the
Hill-Pernasilice trial commenced on January 6, 1975-three and onequarter years after the Attica rebellion. Prior to the pretrial questioning of the prospective jurors, defense counsel requested Justice
King to grant the defendants forty additional peremptory challenges."
5. Id.
6. People o. Hill & Pernasilice resulted from indictments brought by a Special
Wyoming Grand Jury which investigated the Attica prisoner rebellion of 1971. See N.Y.
Times, Dec. 19, 1972, at 1, col. 2. Consequently, the case was originally docketed as
Indictment #1, Supreme Court, Wyoming'County, Dec. 1972. However, pursuant to a
change of venue granted in 1973 (see note 9 infra), the docket entry was changed to
Indictment #1, Supreme Court, Erie County, Dec. 1972. The defendants were convicted on separate offenses on April 5, 1975. See note 26 infra. Appeals were filed on
May 9, 1975, in the Appellate Division, Fourth Department.
7. See generally ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEw YORK STATE SPECIAL
COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972).
8. See note 6 supra. See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 4.
9. People v. Hill, 42 App. Div. 2d 679, 345 N.Y.S.2d 237 (4th Dep't 1973).
(It was also noted that many potential jurors were directly or indirectly associated with
the Attica Correctional Facility.)
10. Id. All of the 42 Attica-related indictments brought by the Wyoming County
grand jury were transferred as a result of this motion.
11. Brief for Hill & Pernasilice as Intervenors at 1, People v. King, 47 App. Div.
2d 594, 363 N.Y.S.2d 682 (4th Dep't), rev'd sub noma.State v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59, 324
N.E.2d 351, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1970) [hereinafter cited as King I]
Hill and Pernasilice were both charged with murder, a Class A Felony. N.Y. PENAL
LAw § 120.25 (McKirmey 1970). Under CPL 270.25(2) (a) each "party" was entitled
to 20 peremptory challenges. It would seem that both Hill and Pernasilice should each
be given 20 peremptory challenges for a total of 40 defense peremptories. However, by
virtue of CPL 270.25(3), "[w]hen two or more defendants are tried jointly, the number
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Justice King granted the defense request to the extent of 10 additional peremptory challenges, even though GPL 270.25 does not expressly condone this novel practice. No objections to this action were
made by the prosecutors at that time.
On the morning of January 8th, after the prosecutors had concluded their voir dire examination of the first group of potential
jurors, they unexpectedly voiced their objection to Justice King's
earlier ruling, but their request for a concomitant increase in peremptory challenges was denied. 12 Unsuccessful in their attempt to persuade
Justice King that his granting of additional peremptories was unauthorized and violative of precedent, the prosecutors instituted an
Article 78 proceeding in the appellate division to attempt to prohibit
Justice King from exceeding his statutory authority. 13
A majority of the appellate division analyzed the merits of Justice
King's action. Strictly construing the language of CPL 270.25, the
court concluded that "[t]he respondent [Justice King] not only violated the express provisions of the section as to the number of peremptory challenges allowed upon trial but acted in violation of the
statutory scheme which allows each party an equal number of peremptory challenges."' 14 Reaffirming the principle that the "matter
of peremptory challenges . . . rests entirely with the legislature,"'I5

the appellate court found that the trial ruling "was made in excess
of the court's powers authorized by the Legislature."', 6 Noting that a
direct appeal of Justice King's ruling was precluded by statute, 7 and
finding that the ruling was prejudicial to the rights of the petitioner,
the appellate division concluded that relief was available under the
of peremptory challenges prescribed . . . is not multiplied by the number of defendants
but such defendants are treated as a single party." Moreover, both defendants had to
join in the challenge in order for a juror to be excused. Thus, Hill and Pernasilice were
not given 20 peremptory challenges apiece, but 20 peremptories in which each defendant
had to acquiesce. While CPL 270.25(3) requires that only a majority of codefendants
join in a challenge, where there are only two joined defendants, unanimity is, of course,
a prerequisite to a successful peremptory challenge.
12. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 61, 324 N.E.2d at 353, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
13. Id. at 61, 62, 324 N.E.2d at 881, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 353. See also N.Y. Civ.
PaRc. LAw §§ 7801-06 (McKinney 1963) which detail, inter ala, the procedures for

the initiation of prohibition proceedings.
14 King I, 47 App. Div. 2d at 595, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
15. Id. See also note 1 supra & accompanying text.
16. King I, 47 App. Div. 2d at 595, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 683.
17. N.Y. CiasI. PRO. LAw §§ 450.20, .40, .50, .80 (McKinney 1971), delineate
those instances in which the People may seek appellate review of a trial ruling. justice
King's order was not embraced by these sections.
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Article 78 proceeding.1 s Accordingly, the appellate court vacated Justice King's ruling, over the dissent of two justices. 19
Upon immediate appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, the
appellate division's finding was reversed after only four days of deliberation. The unanimous court, agreeing with the dissenters below,
determined that the prohibition action was procedurally infirm. Justice Breitel, speaking for the court, stated that "[t]he court may not
entertain a collateral proceeding to review an error of law in a pending
criminal action, however egregious and however unreviewable." 20 Although Justice King's ruling was not subject to direct appeal, the
court asserted that "nonreviewability by way of appeal alone, does not
provide a basis for reviewing error by collateral proceeding in the
21
nature either of prohibition or mandamus."
Evident in the court's opinion was its overriding concern to uphold the statutory policy limiting appeals in criminal actions.20 The
court was cognizant of and demonstrated sensitivity to the problems
of delay associated with special proceedings initiated for the purpose
of reviewing "a plausible error of law, of 'magnitude' in the view of
one side or the other .... "23 While the court acknowledged that appellate intervention is warranted in certain extraordinary situations, 2 4
it could not find that Justice King's ruling was within "the several
categories of excesses of jurisdiction and power arising in criminal
actions which merit the abrupt intervention of prohibition or mandamus." 25 The court rejected what was referred to as an "unsound
18. King I, 47 App. Div. 2d at 595, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
19. Id. The dissenters felt that no harm or prejudice to the state was shown. Moreover, they were of the belief that the remedy of prohibition was inappropriate. Id. (Cardamone & Del Vecchio, JJ., dissenting).
20. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 62, 324 N.E.2d at 353, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 882. The court
assumed for the purposes of review that justice King's action was "an egregious error of
law . . . prejudicial to the rights of the people." Id. at 61, 324 N.E.2d at 353, 364
N.Y.S.2d at 881. Since the merits of Justice King's ruling were not reached, this assumption should not be considered to be of precedential value.
21. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 63, 324 N.E.2d at 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 882 (citation
omitted).
22. See note 17 supra. See also N.Y. GQut. PRO. LAW §§ 450.10, .15, .70 (McKinney 1971) (defendants' right to appeal).
23. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 64-65, 324 N.E.2d at 355, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
24. See, e.g., Proskin v. County Court of Albany County, 30 N.Y.2d 15, 280 N.E.2d
875, 330 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1972) (prohibition granted). In King, the court described
Proskin as a case which "involved a perversion of a criminal action to allow a wholly
unauthorized disclosure of an entire extensive Grand Jury investigation . . . in which
the issues related to the pending criminal action were only a small part." King, 36
N.Y.2d at 64, 324 N.E.2d at 355, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (emphasis added). See also
36 ALBANY L. Rlv. 804 (1973).
25. King, 36 N.Y.2d at 64, 324 N.E.2d at 354, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 883.
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and novel extension of the . . . [remedy] of prohibition," and dis2
missed the state's petition.
By dismissing the petition for prohibition on procedural rather
than substantive grounds, the court of appeals has left undefined the
acceptable parameters of CPL 270.25. However, for the present time,
at least, it does appear that trial-court judges may increase defendants'
statutory allocation of peremptory challenges and remain immune
from the sanctions of an Article 78 proceeding.2 7 Since CPL 270.25
does not authorize the granting of additional peremptories, it appears
that the judicially created power to engage in such a practice illustrates the dilution of the well-established principle that the matter of
peremptory challenges rests entirely with the legislature. 28 The reasons
for Justice King's innovative ruling are not readily apparent. Moreover, neither the court of appeals nor the appellate division found it
necessary to consider the soundness of the rationale for the ruling.
However, there is some evidence of the motivating factors underlying
Justice King's interpretation of CPL 270.25.
26. Id. at 65, 324 N.E.2d at 355, 364 N.Y.S.2d at 884. Upon the dismissal, jury
selection in People u. Hill & Pernasilice resumed and the trial followed. On April 5,
1975, the jury convicted John Hill of murder and Charles Pernasilice of attempted assault. See N.Y. Times, April 6, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
27. Since appeals are pending in People v. Hill & Pernasilice, there remains the
possibility that Justice King's ruling may be reversed on the merits by the court of
appeals. This Comment assumes that this result will not eventuate. If it should be reversed, however, the need for legislative revision of CPL 270.25 would be greater. See
text at 574 for a suggested revision.
King was not the first case in which the court of appeals had the opportunity to
comment upon the practice of increasing the statutory allocation of peremptory challenges. People v. Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696, 249 N.E.2d 747, 301 N.Y.S.2d 961 (1969),
involved the interpretation of the predecessor statutes to CPL 270.25, which also did
not authorize the granting of additional peremptories. See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. §§ 360,
372, 373, repealed by N.Y. SEss. LAws 1970, ch. 996, § 4. One of two jointly tried defendants complained on appeal from conviction that although the trial court gave the
defendants 10 more peremptory challenges than were permitted by statute, the court
"committed prejudicial error in allowing only 30 peremptory challenges" since it was an
extraordinary case involving three felony-murder counts in one indictment. Id. at 703,
249 N.E.2d at 749, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 965. In response the court stated:
The statute, however, provides for only 20 peremptory challenges ....
Indeed,
the court allowed the defendants 10 more challenges than the statute provided
and it is difficult to see how the defendants were prejudiced by the fact that
the trial court allowed them more challenges than the statute provided for.
Id. at 703, 249 N.E.2d at 749-50, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 965. Anthony may be cited as authority for the proposition that defendants are not entitled, as a right, to additional peremptory challenges. However, the court of appeals did not criticize the trial court's invocation of the discretionary power to increase the number of challenges. Although
this issue was not presented for review, the opinion in Anthony illustrates initially that
Justice King's action was not without some precedent. In addition, it may be demonstrative of the court's tacit approval of the trial court's discretionary power to grant additional peremptories.
28. See note 1 supra & accompanying text.
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It was reported that defense counsel for Hill and Pernasilice felt
that additional peremptories were necessary because of the "strong
currents"2 91 against the defendants in the Buffalo area. This argument
was developed by the defendants in briefs submitted in King. Commenting upon the propriety of Justice King's ruling, the defendants
asserted that:
[T/he practice throughout the State, as indicated by affidavits submitted below, has been to grant additional peremptory challenges
to single and multiple criminal defendants in unusual and/or extraordinary cases. That the trial of the underlying indictment, stemming
from the climactic and highly publicized events at the Attica Correctional Facility between September 9 and 13, 1971, is an unusual
and extraordinary case, can hardly be questioned .... Respondent's
granting of additional peremptories to the defense .. . serves as a
remedial force in an attempt to secure a fair and impartial jury.80

The affidavits referred to by the defendants were annexed to their
brief submitted in the appellate division. 31 The affiants were four
practicing attorneys of New York who attested that they either had
heard of or had been counsel in cases in which the trial-court judge
gave additional peremptory challenges to single or multiple defend32
ants because of a high degree of pretrial publicity.
Thus, the desire to mitigate the potential deleterious effects of
29. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1975, at 49, col. 1. It cannot be determined with
any degree of certainty what psychological effect the extensive news coverage given to the
Attica rebellion and related criminal proceedings had upon the potential jurors in Erie
County. However, a statistical study conducted by the Attica Brothers Legal Defense
in connection with a request for a change of venue in September, 1974, revealed that almost 23 percent of those people interviewed in Erie County felt "that they could not be
impartial and follow a Judge's instructions as to applicable legal principles." People v.
Sekou, 45 App. Div. 2d 982, 983, appeal dismissed, 35 N.Y.2d 844, 321 N.E.2d 786,
362 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1974). Although the request for a change of venue was denied, the
study demonstrated that an unusual potential for prejudice existed in the prospective
jury pool for the Attica-related trials. Erie County residents' ostensible lack of direct
personal or economic relations with the Attica Correctional Facility, coupled with their
geographic isolation from it, suggests that the publicity surrounding the Attica revolt may
have shaped the attitudes revealed in the study.
30. Brief for Hill & Pernasilice as Appellant-Intervenors at 8-9, King, 36 N.Y.2d
59, 324 N.E.2d 351, 364 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1975) (emphasis added).
31. Brief for Hill and Perasilice as Intervenors, appendices, King I, 47 App. Div.
2d 594, 363 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1975).
32. One afflant stated that additional peremptories may be warranted in multipledefendant cases where the defendants may have adverse defenses. While this problem
apparently was not raised by Hill and Pernasilice, it does demonstrate a deficiency of
CPL 270.25 in its treatment of multiple defendants as a single party. A suggested revision to the single party treatment is discussed at note 173 infra and presented in the
text at 574.
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33
the extensive publicity given the Attica rebellion and related events
by the news media was the basis of the request for, and apparently
the grant of, additional peremptory challenges. An examination of the
function of the peremptory challenge and the serious difficulties encountered by defendants in cases imbued with unusually extensive
pretrial publicity reveals that the discretionary power of a trial court
to grant defendants additional peremptories may well "[serve] as a
34
remedial force in an attempt to secure a fair and impartial jury.

II.

THE JURY SELECTION PROCESS: STRIVING FOR IMPARTIALITY

In order to fully comprehend the impact of Justice King's ruling,
the peremptory challenge must be viewed in the context of the jury
selection process as a whole. The right to be tried by a jury3 5 is reduced to an empty promise if the jury impaneled to decide the guilt
or innocence of the accused is less than impartial. 36 In light of this
consideration, several procedural safeguards are available to the accused to insure that the jury selection process is not tainted by partiality. Potential threats to the integrity of the jury-trial system can
theoretically be alleviated in a number of ways. The most fundamental and general remedy is the change of venue 37 which, if granted,
permits the accused to be tried in an area in which the potential
jurors are further removed from the facts and emotional effects of
the underlying offense. For example, a major reason for granting
the Attica defendants a change of venue was that a significant number
of potential jurors in Wyoming County were directly or indirectly
associated with the Attica Correctional Facility.88
Additionally or alternatively, a general challenge to the entire
jury panel may be made as a result of alleged irregularities in the.
manner in which the panel was chosen from. the general population.
33. This conclusion is premised upon the belief that the Attica rebellion and the
ensuing criminal proceedings received an extraordinary amount of news coverage by the
press, radio and television. It would be a formidable and unnecessary task to document
the plethora of articles and newscasts devoted to coverage of Attica-related incidents.
34. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
36. Cf. Comment, Voir Dire: Strategy Tactics in the Defense of Social and Political

Activists, 5 AKRON L. REv. 265, 266 (1972). Due process requires that a defendant be
tried before a tribunal which is free of actual bias. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133,
136 (1955).
37. N.Y. CRIm. PRo.
LAws 1974, ch. 367, § 14.
38. See note 9 supra.

LAw

§ 230.20 (McKinney 1971), as amended, N.Y. SEss.
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Since a fair trial requires that a jury be drawn from a representative
cross-section of the community, the elimination of some groups from
jury duty may impinge upon an accused's sixth amendment guarantee
to a fair and impartial jury.8 9
A. The Challenge for Cause
Where trial has proceeded to the final stage of jury selection,
challenges may be directed to specific jurors who are felt to be unqualified. Under the voir dire procedure in New York4" counsel are
given the opportunity to question prospective jurors for the purpose
of eliciting the necessary information pertaining to the jurors' qualifications. If, on the basis of the information revealed by a juror, it is
thought that such a juror is not qualified, counsel initially will challenge the juror for cause. 41 The mere invocation of such a challenge
does not necessarily result in the eliminaton of the challenged juror.
It is within the discretionary powers of the trial court to determine
whether the statutory grounds for challenging for cause have been
met.4
Section 270.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law sets forth the
grounds upon which a challenge for cause may be premised. If it
is shown, inter alia, that a prospective juror is not qualified under the
judiciary law; 48 or is related within the sixth degree of consanguinity
4
or affinity to the defendant or any other party involved in the trial; "
or was a witness at the preliminary hearing or before the grand jury
or-will be a witness at trial; 45 or was a member of the grand jury which
indicted the defendant; 40 then the juror is subject to a challenge for
39. Such a challenge was made in one of the Attica-related cases. As a result of the

successful challenge, the names of certain prospective jurors selected at a time when the
Erie County selection procedure was discriminatory were struck from the list. See People
v. Attica Bros., 79 Misc. 2d 492, 359 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1974). See also Comment,
Attica Jury Pools and the Intent Requirement of the Equal Protection Clause, 24
BUFFALO L. 1REv. 347 (1975).

40. N.Y. Cium. PRo. LAW § 270.15 (McKinney 1971). But see FED. R. CRIm. P.
24(a) -(the court may, at its discretion, allow counsel to question potential jurors).
41. N.Y. Cum. PRO. LAW § 270.20 (McKinney 1971), as amended, N.Y. SEss.
LAWS 1974, ch. 367, § 14 [hereinafter cited as CPL 270.20].
42. CPL 270.20 (2) states, in part, that "[a]ll issues of fact and law arising on the
challenge must be tried and determined by the court."
43. CPL 270.20 (1) (a).

44. CPL 270.20(1) (c).
45. CPL 270.20(1) (d).
46. CPL 270.20(1)(e).
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cause. It is presumed that a juror who -possesses one-of the above47
mentioned attributes is biased.
Challenges for cause premised upon these grounds present, few
problems since they can be verified and easily substantiated. 48 However, challenges for cause directed toward the state of mind of a p9tential juror present more difficult problems of proof.4
Voir dire examination may reveal, that a juror has a preconceived opinion relating to the issues at trial, the guilt or innocence-of
the accused, or in capital cases, the death penalty. 50 Such a juror is
-subject to a challenge for cause as the juror would logically appear
to be less than impartial. 1 It becomes necessary for the trial court to
determine whether the juror's "state of mind.. . is likely to preclude
'him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon -the evidence
adduced at the trial." 52 The burden is upon the challenging party to
demonstrate -that the challenged juror has the improper "state of
mind." Absent the juror's confession that he cannot be impartial, and
in light of the less than cogent. definition of impartiality, the challenging party's burden may be a formidable one indeed. When' a
juror states that he can set aside his opinion or beliefs -and render
a fair and impartial verdict, the trial court will usually conclude that
the juror is qualified. 3 Moreover, since the trial court is given wide
discretion in this area, its decision not to exclude a challenged juror
54
will seldom be reversed on appeal.
47. At common law a challenge based upon one of these grounds was known as a
challenge to the principal cause. If such a challenge were substantiated, actual bids was
presumed. Thus, there was nothing left for the discretion of the court. See Brown v.
Woolverton, 219 Ala. 112, 115, 121 So. 404, 406- (1928).
48. In addition to a juror's admission of a cognizable ground for challenge, rec6rds
can verify a juror's familial relation to a party, or his participation in another stage of
the criminal proceeding.
49. CPL 270.20(1) (b); CPL 270.20(1) (c).
50. CPL '270.20(1)(f), as amended, N.Y. Siss. LAws 1974, ch. 367, § 14.
51. However, the nebulous term of impartiality defies cogent definition. As the
Supreme Court once observed:
Impartiality is not a techncial conception. It is a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitution
lays dowrn no particular tests and procedure is not chained to any ancient and
artificial formula.
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,. 145-46 (1936).
52. CPL270.20 (1) (b),
53. Cf., e.g., People v. Otto, 101 N.Y. 690,5 N.E. 788 (1885).
54. See People v. McGonegal, 136 N.Y. 62, 32 N.E. 616 '(1892). "The conscientious attorney who decides that he has a justifiable complaint ... discovers at once that
few areas of law present such a low probability of success on the appellate level." Comment, Voir Dire in Pennsylvania, 32 U. PiTT. L. R:v. 362, 363 (1971).
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B. The Peremptory Challenge
Although the success of a challenge for cause cannot be guaranteed, the constitution requires that the accused be given the opportunity to prove the actual bias of a juror. 55 Failing to sustain a challenge for cause, counsel is not without further recourse. Subject to
limitations set forth in CPL 270.25, both the accused and the state are
entitled to challenge a certain number of jurors peremptorily, i.e.,
without stating or proving the grounds for the challenge. 6
This peculiar form of juror challenge stems from the English
common law. 57 In the English and American criminal justice systems
which sanctify the right to be tried by an impartial jury, one can
easily appreciate the necessity of challenges for cause in the jury selection process.5 8 However, the necessity of peremptory challenges is not
as readily apparent. William Blackstone described the peremptory
challenge as "an arbitrary and capricious species of challenge . . . a
provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which
our English laws are justly famous." 59 Thus, it has been observed that
the "original purpose of the peremptory challenge was to allow opposing parties an opportunity to pick a sympathetic jury."06 While
this may be a correct statement in both a historical and practical sense,
it overlooks the more viable functions of the peremptory challenge.
As noted previously, the challenge for cause is designed to eliminate partial jurors. However, as a result of the difficulties encountered
in asserting such a challenge, some arguably biased jurors may escape
55. See note 1 supra.
56. See note 3 supra.

57. For an excellent history of the peremptory challenge, see Swain v. Alabama,
380 U.S. 202, 212-22 (1965).
58. It has been said that the necessity of challenge for cause was obviated by the
transformation of the role of the jury from a body of witnesses to a body of fact-finders
whose duty was to decide the issue on the basis of evidence presented by others. Fair
decision-maklng required that jurors be impartial. Consequently, challenges for cause
were the principal means by which partial jurors could be eliminated. See generally 47
Am. JUR. 2d Jury § 213 (1969). For an informative and detailed history of the development of the common law jury, see 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW
323-50 (3d ed. 1931).
59. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809). This is not an entirely accurate description, however. The Crown was initially entitled to peremptorily
challenge an unlimited number of jurors. While this practice was stopped by statute,
the courts in England, feeling that peremptories were important to both sides, circumvented the mandate of statute by allowing the Crown to ask jurors to stand aside. If
the jury box was not full when the entire panel was exhausted only then did the Crown
have to challenge the jurors for cause. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. at 213.
60. Comment, The Impartial Jury-Twentieth Century Dilemma: Some Solutions
to the Conflict Between Free Press and Fair Trial, 51 CORNELL L. REV. 306, 315 n.60

(1966).
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elimination. Thus, "[w]hile challenges for cause permit rejection of
jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis
of partiality, the peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined
partiality that is less easily designated or demonstratable."' 61 The peremptory challenge, then, is viewed as a supplemental protective device
for securing an impartial jury, as the "function of the challenge is
not only to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure
the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will decide
on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." 62
Moreover, the mere availability of peremptory challenges promotes a
more probing voir dire examination of prospective jurors and more
efficient use of challenges for cause by "removing the fear of incurring
a juror's hostility through examination and [unsuccessful] challenge
for cause."

When viewed from this perspective, it is patently clear that peremptory challenges play a necessary role in the jury selection process.
This is evident from the fact that peremptory challenges exist in every
jurisdiction in this country, notwithstanding criticism of their tendency to protract voir dire, to create added expense in requiring the
summoning of a great number of veniremen, and to eliminate qualified veniremen. 4 Although all jurisdictions give the prosecution the
right to peremptorily challenge, the challenge has been primarily referred to as "one of the most important of the rights secured to the
accused."0' 5 This declaration reasonably follows from the fact that it is
the accused's life or liberty which is jeopardized if he is tried by a
biased jury. The special importance of peremptory challenges to de61.

380 U.S. at 220.

62. Id. at 219.
63. Id. at 219-20.
64. Id. at 216. The last-mentioned criticism has been mainly directed toward de-

fendant's use of the challenge. Id. at 216 n.19. However, in Swain it was the defendant
who questioned the prosecutor's alleged discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge
to eliminate Blacks. The Supreme Court observed that the peremptory may be exercised
on the grounds of race or nationality, "[f]or the question a prosecutor or defendant
must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial,
but whether one from a different group is less likely to be." Id. at 220-21. Noting that
race or religion have constituted grounds for a challenge for cause, the Court upheld
the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges as a result of the presumption that the
state uses peremptories to achieve a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 222. Peremptory challenges based upon race, nationality, or religion may be necessary in some situations to
eliminate bias. This is perhaps another reason for the universal acceptance of peremptories because courts are generally not willing to approve a challenge for cause based
upon discriminatory grounds. See Comment, The Right of Peremptory Challenge, 24
U. Ci. L. R1xv. 751, 761-62 (1957).
65. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1888).
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fendants is also reflected in numerous state statutes which grant the
defendant more peremptories than the prosecution. 0 In fact, the present equal distribution scheme of peremptory challenges between the
state and the accused contained in CPL 270.25 did not always exist, in
-New York. "When first permitted in this state the [state's] right was
greatly restricted, and until the Act of 1873, a much larger number
'of peremptory challenges was given to an accused person than to the
prosecution."67
While the opportunity to peremptorily challenge prospective
jurors is especially important to the accused, it must be noted that
-there is no constitutional requirement for peremptory challenges.08
Since 'they are provided as a privilege, rather than a right, peremptory
challenges must be exercised with the limitations placed thereon. 0
Thus, the New York Legislature was free to equalize the allocation of
peremptory challenges between the state and the accused. Moreover,
every jurisdiction has placed various limits upon the exercise of peremptory challenges. The United States Supreme Court once observed,
however, that "the power of the legislature of a state to prescribe the
number of peremptory challenges is limited only by the necessity bf
having an impartial trial.17 0 Commenting upon the manner in which
proper juries are selected, the Court has noted that "[e]xperience has
shown that one of the most effective means to free the jury-box from
•men unfit to be there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge." 7'
Although every state has apparently determined that an impartial trial
requires the availability of some peremptory challenges, there is a lack
of agreement as to the number of perefiiptory challenges necessary to
achieve that goal.
New York's grant of 20 peremptory challenges in trials involving
class A felonies is relatively large. 72 However, some jurisdictions have
66. See, e.g., Mi. ANN. CODE VOL. 9B, rule 746(1) (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN.
vol. 27A, rule 26.02, subd. 6 (Supp 1975); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 546.180 (1953); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 41-23-39(d)(i) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-21(a)(b) (Supp.
1974); ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 136.230 (1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-2505 (1955); Fan.
R. CRIm. P. 24(b). It has been suggested that defendants be given a greater number
of peremptory challenges to offset the state's advantageous ability to obtain information
concerning prospective jurors. This information aids in the exercise of peremptory challenges. See Smith, Criminal Justice in America: A Reply, 11 A.B.A.J. 797, 798 (1925).
67. People v. McQuade, 110 N.Y. 284, 293, 18 N.E. 156, 158 (1886).
68. See note 1 supra. See also Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586-87
(1919).
69. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 587 (1919).
'
-70., Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71 (1886) (dictum).

71. Id. at 70.
72. It is thought that this large number of peremptory challenges compensates

multiple defendants for their treatment as a single party under CPL 270.25 (3); cf. ABA,
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decided that 25 peremptories are essential where the accused is charged
with a felony which is punishable by death.7 3 It is apparent that the
various jurisdictions, recognizing both the necessity of peremptory
challenges and the potential for abuse in granting an unlimited number of them, have attempted to prescribe a sufficient but limited number
of peremptories to insure impartiality in most trial situations. However, as Hill and Pernasilice asserted in King,7 4 the statutory allocation of peremptory challenges may be inadequate in cases which have
attracted extensive press coverage. Implicit in this line of reasoning
is the notion that other devices designed to insure an impartial trial,
i.e., a change of venue or challenges for cause, provide inadequate
protection. Therefore, the right to a fair trial is preserved and the
interests of justice are served by granting additional peremptory challenges "to eliminate the extremes of partiality"7 5 which are exacerbated
by the deleterious effects of pretrial publicity.
III.

RATIONALE UNDERLYING THE EXPANDED USE OF
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

A. Effects of PretrialPublicity -

The Judicial Reaction

The fundamental right of freedom of the press is guaranteed by
express constitutional provision.70 A well-informed populace is considered to be vital to the stability and continuation of our democratic
form of government. Moreover, the reporting and investigative procedures employed by the news media provide the means by which the
potential abuses inherent in secretive judicial proceedings are prevented.77 Justice Clark, speaking for the Supreme Court in Sheppard
v.. Maxwell,78 observed that
[a] responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its
function in this regard is documented by an impressive record of
service over several centuries. The press does not simply publish
Standards Relating to Trial By jury 74 (Tent. Draft 1968). For a suggested change in
the New York single-party rule see text at 574. Compare CPL 270.25(2) with IowA
CODE ANN. § 779.11 (Supp. 1975) (the state and the accused receive eight peremptory
challenges if the crime charged is punishable with life imprisonment) and FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 913.08(1) (a) (1973) (10 peremptories are allotted).

73. See, e.g.,

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 51-242 (Supp. 1975).

74. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
75. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
77. Cf. In re Olver, 333 U.S. 257, 268 (1948).
78. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism70
As a result, the press generally has been given "a free hand"8' 0 in reporting or commenting upon criminal judicial proceedings. However,
it is clear that an unrestricted and over-zealous press may go beyond

its function as a protector of the criminal justice system. It may assume, instead, the role of a prosecutor through its investigative powers,
the role of an attorney through its ability to color and present the
"facts," or finally, the role of a jury through its promulgation of its
opinion on the merits of the case. 8' In so doing, the accused's due
process guarantee to be tried by an impartial jury8 2 may be undermined if, in fact, press coverage has some adverse impact uponl the
impartiality of potential or actual jurors. Over the years, courts have
become increasingly aware of the persuasive power of the press. Since
the courts have "been unwilling to place any direct limitations on the
freedom traditionally exercised by the news media" 83 and reluctant
to undermine the constitutional right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury, a conflict necessarily exists between these two constitutional rights.8 4 A discussion of the proper function of the jury illustrates the impact of this conflict upon the right to fair trial; an examination of the judicial response to this conflict and an analysis of the
psychological effects of prejudicial publicity demonstrate how the
granting of additional peremptory challenges can help to preserve this
right.
The ideal jury theoretically consists of twelve unbiased jurors,
who, under the guidance of a judge, decide the case solely upon the
evidence adduced at trial.8 5 Through the implementation of the rules
79. Id. at 350.
80. Id.
81. Sheppard is perhaps the one case which best illustrates the transformation of
the press from a protector of justice to a perpetrator of injustice. The Supreme Court's
opinion is replete with references to the inflammatory and conclusionary press comment.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in part, that "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and the district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... "
83. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
84. See generally A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY (1967);
J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS (1966); Comment, Free Press v. Fair Trial: A
ConstitutionalDichotomy, 20 LOYOLA L. Rxv. 148 (1974).
85. Cf. Baker v. Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir. 1942).
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of evidence, information which may unduly confuse or prejudice, notwithstanding its probative value, is excluded from the jury.-6 Justice
Holmes once observed that "[t]he theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether
private talk or public print."8 7 However, in a country in which a free
press will often publish reports concerning the details of a crime, its
alleged perpetrator, or an ongoing criminal trial, potential and actual
jurors are likely to be exposed to information which has not been subjected to the exclusionary rules of evidence.88 Since this information
may be inaccurate or prejudicial and have a great impact on the mind
of a juror,8 9 his impartiality may be questionable. It would be an
impossible task, however, to locate jurors completely sheltered from
extrajudicial knowledge of a case.
Since restrictions upon the press have never met with overwhelming judicial approval,90 it became apparent that the potential
for unconstitutionally biased jurors in highly publicized criminal cases
would increase as the power of the news media to disseminate information expanded. Consequently, it was decided early in the history
of this nation that jurors exposed to, but not prejudicially influenced
by press coverage of a particular case, could constitute an impartial
jury, thus preserving the accused's sixth amendment guarantee.9 1 The
press retained full freedom to publish while the appellate courts could
rectify any injustice resulting therefrom.
Over the years the Supreme Court has been presented with numerous cases in which defendants have alleged that juror bias resulting from publicity prevented a fair trial. These post-conviction review
cases have both reversed convictions when trials were tainted by extraordinary news coverage and have also articulated principles by which
the formulation of preventative measures has been guided.
The Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States92 noted that a

juror who had formed an opinion as a result of extrajudicial "evi86. Comment, supra note 60, at 307.
87. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
88. But see Warren & Abell, Free Press-FairTrial: The "Gag Order", A California

Aberration, 45 S. CAL. L. Rav. 51, 81 (1972).
89. Comment, supra note 60, at 307.
90. See note 83 supra.
91. Chief Justice Marshall once stated "that light impressions which may fairly be
supposed to yield to the testimony" do not disqualify a juror, "but . . those strong and
deep impressions which will close the mind against the testimony" suffice for a challenge
for cause. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (No. 14,692g) (C.C. Va. 1807).
92. 98 U.S. 145 (1878)
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dence" could not be presumed to be biased. Moreover, the burden
was placed upon the defendant to show that the preconceived opinion
was of such a nature as to raise the "presumption of partiality."93 This
case established an obviously difficult burden for the defendant especially where the opinionated juror professes that he will be able
to set aside his opinion. 94 Ostensibly, Reynolds demonstrated the belief
that a juror's exposure to extrajudicial information only minimally
affected the juror's ability to be impartial. Later cases, however, illustrate the Supreme Court's increased, yet still limited, sensitivity to the
free-press-fair-trial conflict.
In Marshall v. United States,95 some members of the jury were
exposed to news reports which described the defendant's criminal
record. Notwithstanding the assurances of those jurors that they could
be impartial, the Court determined that the information had a high
potential for prejudice and reversed the conviction. While this case
apparently stood for the proposition that a juror's mere exposure to
inadmissible prejudicial information would raise the presumption of
partiality, its coverage was restricted to federal cases.9 0
In 1961, the Supreme Court, for the first time, reversed a statecourt conviction on the basis of the defendant's inability to receive
an impartial trial because of intense pretrial publicity. In Irvin v.
Dowd,9" the defendant was tried and convicted in a community which
had been deluged with news accounts of the defendant's prior criminal
behavior.
The Court looked to the voir dire examination and noted that
8 of the 12 actual jurors expressed bias against the accused, yet claimed
that they would be able to set aside their opinions. Since almost 90
percent of the prospective jurors examined expressed a belief in the
93. Id. at 156.
94. Of course, the trial judge renders the final decision on a juror's impartiality or
lack thereof, as "[i]t is thought that by observing the juror's manner in making such an
assertion [the ability to set aside an opinion] the trial court is able to decide whether
or not the juror is impartial." Comment, Fair Trial v. Free Press: The Psychological
Effect of Pre-trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to Be Impartial; A Plea for Reform,
38 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 672, 675 (4965).
95. 360 U.S. 310 (1959). Prior to Marshall, some members of the Supreme Court,
in several decisions, expressed their displeasure with the requirement that a defendant
prove that extrajudicial influences actually prejudiced the jury. However, a less stringent
requirement did not, in fact, find favor with a majority of the Court until Marshall, and
later decisions. See, e.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Leviton v. United States, 343 U.S. 946 (1952) (Mem. of Frankfurter, J.,
on the denial of certiorari); Sheppard v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (Per curiamn;
Jackson, J., concurring).
96. 360 U.S. at 313.
97. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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defendant's guilt, the Court easily found that the case had become- a
cause cdl~bre in the community. The sum total of these facts indicated
such a "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice"' 8 that the jurors who
thought they could set aside their opinions could not be believed.
Eight out of the 12 [jurors] thought petitioner was guilty. With such
an opinion permeating their minds, it would be difficult to say that
each could exclude this preconception of guilt from his deliberations.
The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is so persistent
that it unconsciously fights detachment from the mental processes
of the average man. 99
Thus, for the first time a state-court defendant had met the burden
of the test set forth in Reynolds v. United States by showing actual
prejudice.10 0 While the Court's dictum concerning the psychological
effects of publicity and preconceptions apparently illustrated its recognition of the theories of modern psychology, 101 other dicta in theCourt's opinion more accurately reflected the tenor of its decision.
Speaking for the court and attempting to set forth the definition
of an indifferent juror, Justice Clark stated that:
It is not required, however, that the jurors be totally ignorant of the
facts and the issues involved ....

To hold that the mere existence

of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused,
without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective
juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard.
It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' 02
Thus, an allegedly biased juror may take a seat in the jury box if he
convinces the trial court that he can disregard his bias. Although the
Court also noted that the biases created by extensive news coverage
are not easily set aside, this principle has been narrowly applied. Some
decisions have demonstrated that the presumption of juror impartiality
will be rebutted in only the most flagrant cases. 1 03
98. Id. at 727.

99. Id. (citation omitted).
100. Comment, supra note 60, at 309.
101. See notes 151-60 infra & accompanying text.

102. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961).

103. See, e.g., Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), where the defendant
claimed that he was convicted by a jury influenced by publicity. The Court examined
the voir dire but refused to reverse the conviction. The Court distinguished Beck from
Dowd in that only 27 percent of the prospective jurors thought the defendant was guilty;
that the actual jurors had expressed no opinion of guilt; that th& news stories were
factual rather than vindictive; that sufficient time had elapsed between the publicity and
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In subsequent cases the Supreme Court reversed several statecourt convictions without examining the voir dire. Prejudice was presumed as a result of the extremely virulent pretrial publicity and/or
the prejudicial atmosphere created by the press through its presence
in the courtroom during the trial.
In Rideau v. Louisiana,0 4 a film of the defendant's confession
was broadcast over the local television station on at least three occasions
prior to trial. A request for a change of venue based upon this fact
was denied. The Supreme Court found the trial so lacking in due
process'05 that it did not feel it was necessary to examine the record
on voir dire. Reversal followed as a matter of course.
Three years later the conviction of Billie Sol Estes was before the
Supreme Court for review in Estes v. Texas. 0 6 The defendant's trial
had received live television coverage which was said to have prevented
a fair and impartial trial. The Court reversed the conviction, deciding
that the television coverage had created a prejudicial atmosphere totally
inimical to a fair trial guarantee. 0 7
An important decision on the subject of free press-fair trial is
Sheppard v. Maxwell. 0 8 In Sheppard the defendant, who was convicted for the murder of his wife, was also the subject of highly inflammatory pretrial publicity. His interrogation at a coroner's inquest,
at which he appeared without counsel, was televised locally. In addition, the news media was given free access to the courtroom during the
trial.
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction citing, inter alia, the
numerous instances of prejudicial news reporting and the trial-court
judge's failure to adequately control the carnival atmosphere created
by the press.' 09 The Court indicated that the showing of actual prejudice was not a prerequisite for reversal in every trial prefaced by extensive publicity." 0 However, by relying on the totality of the circumstances"' to justify its decision, the Court made it clear that aptrial, and that the defendant had not challenged for cause any of the seated jurors. But
cf. United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 372
U.S. 978 (1963), where the Second Circuit reversed a New York state conviction on the
basis of the Dowd rationale.
104. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
105. Id. at 727.
106. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
107. Id. at 587 (Harlan, J., concurring) (television cameras have no business in
the courtroom).
108. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
109. Id. at 340-42, 355.
110. Id. at 351-52.
111. Id. at 352.
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pellate review of "publicity" cases would be made on a case-by-case
basis. It was apparent that there would be no clearly defined standards
to judge the impact of publicity upon the Tight to a fair trial.
The Court noted, with disapproval, the increasing tendency of the
i 12
press to offer unfair and prejudicial comments about pending trials.
It recognized that "the difficulty in effacing prejudicial publicity from
the minds of jurors" placed upon trial courts the duty "to ensure that
the balance is never weighed against the accused." 113 Thus, where the
trial court has failed to take "strong measures" to prevent prejudicial
publicity from infecting the proceeding, the appellate courts are dutybound "to make an independent evaluation of the circumstances""14
in order to determine whether the trial met constitutional standards.
In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United
States ex rel. Doggert v. Yeager,"x5 through its independent evaluation
of the circumstances and a novel interpretation of previous Supreme
Court decisions, reversed a state-court conviction. Yeager involved
a habeas proceeding brought by a defendant who alleged that the "trial
court failed to take appropriate steps to protect the jury from the possible taint""' 6 of several prejudicial news articles published during the
course of his trial."17 The court noted that Marshall was factually
analogous"" but expressly limited to the federal courts. However, the
Yeager court reasoned that decisions subsequent to Marshall made it
applicable to state-court cases. The Yeager court interpreted Dowd,
Rideau and Estes to mean that it was "no longer necessary that a defendant show that the jury actually was prejudiced . . .[or] that .. .
prejudicial material actually reached the jury. . ."19 Thus, the court
concluded that the underlying theory of Marshall, that a juror's mere
exposure to prejudicial articles would disqualify him notwithstanding
112. Id. at 362.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 472 F.2d 229 (3d Cir. 1973).
116. Id. at 230.
117. Two jurors who were ultimately excused admitted to reading news articles
concerning the defendant's previously withdrawn guilty plea and purported escape attempt despite the trial court's warning not to do so. These jurors stated that the publicity would not affect their impartiality. However, the trial court refused to ask the
other jurors whether or not the articles had been discussed among them. Id. at 230-31.
On another occasion, after a newspaper containing an article regarding the defendant's
withdrawn guilty plea was seen in a luncheonette in which several of the jurors had
eaten, the trial court refused to inquire whether or not the jurors had read the story.
Id. at 231.
118. Id. at 237.
119. Id. at 238.
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his assurances of impartiality, was held to be applicable to state-court
0
defendants.12
Although the extension of Marshall to state-court cases more accurately reflects the findings of modem psychological research on the
effects of prejudicial publicity, 2 1 the Supreme Court in a subsequent
decision expressly rejected such an extension.
,In Murphy v. Florida2 2 the defendant was convicted in 1970 on
charges stemming from a 1968 robbery. During the interim, Murphy
was indicted for and convicted of an unrelated murder charge in
March, 1969. In addition, he pleaded guilty to one count of a federal
indictment involving stolen securities. These events were extensively
publicized in the county in which the robbery trial took place. 23
In rejecting Murphy's claim that he was denied a fair trial because
some jurors knew about his past convictions, the Court found that
Marshall could not be applied beyond the federal courts. 124 Moreover, the Court rejected any notion that Dowd and its progeny had
dispensed with the requirement that a state-court defendant prove
that extrajudicial evidence had actually prejudiced the jury against
him. The Court observed that under the circumstances in Dowd
actual prejudice was readily apparent. 25 While prejudice was presumed in Estes, Rideau and Maxwell because "the influence of the
news media either in the community at large or in the courtroom itself, pervaded the proceedings,"' 2 6 the Court refused to equate the
facts in Murphy with those present in the prior cases. In Murphy, the
Court looked to the totality of the circumstances 127 in order to determine whether the jury may have been prejudicially affected by extrajudicial knowledge of the case or the defendant's prior criminal record.
Reaffirming the mandate of Dowd that the defendant must "raise
the presumption of partiality,"'' 2 the Court reevaluated the voir dire.
120. Making its independent evaluation of the circumstances as Sheppard required,
the court found that a new trial was required "because there was a substantial likelihood
that the contents of the newspaper accounts making reference to his retracted guilty plea
and to an alleged escape attempt came to the attention of the jurors who deliberated."
472 F.2d at 239 (emphasis added).
121. See notes 153-60 infra & accompanying text.
122. 95 S. Ct. 2031 (1975).
123. Murphy first achieved notoriety as a result of his role in the 1964 theft of
the Star of India sapphire from a New York museum, and remained a newsworthy figure
thereafter. Despite the publicity concerning Murphy and his other convictions, the trial
court denied a change of venue. Id.
124. Id. at 2035.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 2036.
128. Id.
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Although several jurors knew of Murphy's criminal record, it was
found that only one juror exhibited any bias. However, an examination of the entire voir dire transcript enabled the Court to conclude
29
that this juror "had no deep impression-of the petitioner at all."'

The Court noted that under certain conditions assurances of impartiality from jurors who had formed opinions concerning a defendant's
guilt could be disregarded. However, the Court stressed that such
assurances would not be considered dispositive only if it is found that
substantial prejudice existed in the entire group of prospective jurors,
i.e., "where most veniremen . . . admit[ted] to a disqualifying preju-

dice [during voir dire]."'130 Since only 20 of the 78 jurors examined
were excused because of their opinion about the defendant's guilt, the
Court distinguished Murphy from Dowd. In the latter case, over half
of the prospective jurors had admitted to predisposition. 131 This difference, the Court observed, prevented it from holding that the community in which the defendant was tried was so prejudiced against
him "as to impeach the indifferences of jurors who displayed no hostile
animus of their own."' 13 2 Therefore, since no inherent or actual prejudice was shown to exist in the setting of the trial, the Court denied
133
the habeas relief.
Several trends can be discerned from the preceding cases. First,
these decisions illustrate the Supreme Court's awareness of the adverse
effects of prejudicial publicity. However, they also demonstrate that
different standards of review are applicable depending on the original
forum. In federal cases, it has been determined that a juror's mere
exposure during trial to inadmissible and prejudicial information
necessarily rebuts the presumption of impartiality. 3 4 However, in
state-court trials, the Supreme Court has found that a juror's extrajudicial knowledge of similar information does not alone rebut the
presumption of impartiality. 35 Thus, the Supreme Court has put a
129. Id. at 2037. The length of time between the publication of the bulk of
news articles and the trial (seven months) and the factual nature of the news articles,
were not seen by the Court as indications of an inflammatory community atmosphere.
Id.; see note 103 supra.
130. 95 S. Ct. at 2037 (emphasis added).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2038.
133. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, found that the transcript of the voir dire illus-"
trated a general feeling of prejudice against the defendant which had been engendered
by the news media. Consequently, the trial court's denial of Murphy's motion for a
change of venue, Justice Brennan reasoned, was prejudicial error. Id. (Brennan, J:,
dissenting).
134. See Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959).
135. See notes 122-32 supra & accompanying text.
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state-court defendant who claims his trial was infected by prejudicial
publicity at a disadvantage in the appellate courts in relation to his
federal-court counterpart.
Second, the Supreme Court, while cognizant of the tendency of
the news media to unfairly report and comment upon pending cases,
has not mandated the use of prior restraints upon the press. 180 Moreover, various judicial committees have similarly eschewed the placing
of direct restraints on the press. 37 While the invocation and enforcement of prior restraints in spectacular or unusual criminal actions
would significantly reduce the ill-effects of the free-press-fair-trial conflict, the constitutional questions raised thereby have apparently inhibited the use of such devices to protect a defendant's right to a
fair trial. Although it has been suggested that first and sixth amendment guarantees are of equal importance, 3 8 some commentators have
seen the various publicity cases as illustrative of the Supreme Court's
preference for freedom of the press. 139 It is true that the many attempts to curb the power of the press have been rejected by the
Court.140 However, more recent developments suggest that the traditional constitutional protections afforded the news media may be
diminishing.' 4
Silence or gag orders have been issued by trial courts with increasing frequency in order to ensure that prospective jurors are not
unduly or unconsciously influenced by extrajudicial knowledge of a
pending criminal proceeding. Gag orders which prohibit the parties to
136. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
137. See, e.g., ABA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAiR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 150 (Approved draft 1968) [hereinafter
cited as REARDON REPORT]; SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RADIO, TELEVISION AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK,
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, FINAL REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS Vii

(1967); Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 401-02 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Kaufman
Report].
138. Cf. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
139. Comment, Constitutional Law--Free Press v. Fair Trial, 19 LOYOLA L. REV.
332, 334 (1973).
140. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (attempted
use of prior restraint rejected). See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig
v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges
v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversals of contempt convictions for publications
since there were no clear and present dangers).

141. Cf., e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)

(newspaper reporter has

no testimonial privilege to conceal sources of, and facts relating to, criminal activity
being investigated by the grand jury which subpoenas him). But cf. Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 421 U.S. 997 (1975) (a state cannot restrict a newspaper's publication
of a rape victim's name obtained from public judicial records).
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a criminal action and court personnel from commenting on the case andeliminate potential sources of prejudicial publicity, have withstood constitutional attack.1 42 The constitutionality of gag orders which directly
prohibit the news media's coverage of a criminal trial, however, remains in doubt.1 43 In 1974, Mr. Justice Powell, sitting as a circuit
justice, granted a stay in a Louisiana trial judge's order which prohibited, inter alia, the publication of the accused's criminal record, alleged confessions, or inculpatory statements. 4 - In a more recent case,
however, Mr. Justice Blackmun, in his capacity as a circuit justice,
approved a portion of a Nebraska court's order which restrained the
media from lublishing prior to trial, confessions, statements against
interest, and the criminal record of the accused in a widely-publicized
murder-rape case. 145 Although no generalizations concerning the validity of gag orders can be made at this juncture, guidance in this
unsettled area of constitutional law may be forthcoming since the
Supreme Court has decided to hear the appeal from the Nebraska
Supreme Court's modification of the gag order ruled upon by Mr.
Justice Blackmun. 46
Since the desirability, effectiveness, 47 and constitutional status of
prior restraints upon the media is uncertain, it is suggested that innovative procedures such as granting additional peremptory challenges
to defendants, may be employed to mitigate the adverse effects of pretrial publicity without unduly restricting the media's functions. It is
against this background that Justice Gilbert King's ruling should be
viewed.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Tijerina, 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied$

396 U.S. 390 (1969) (defendant convicted of contempt for disobeying the court's
silence order).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir. 1972),
wherein the court vacated and remanded the contempt convictions of two reporters
which were later affirmed. 349 F. Supp. 227 (M.D. La. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 476
F.2d 373 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973). Although the silence order was
held unconstitutional, the contempt conviction was valid because it was only collaterally
related to the underlying order, which effectively prevented the appellate court from
disturbing the conviction. For illustrations of the difficulty in seeking review of silence
orders see Rendleman, Free Press-FairTrial: Review of Silence Orders, 52 N.C.L. Rav.
127 (1973).
144. Times-Picayune Publishing Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 95 S. Ct. 1 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1974).
145. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 96 S. Ct. 251 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice,

1975).
146. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 63 Neb. S.C.J. 783,
granted, -

U.S.L.W.

-

-

N.W.2d

-,

cert.

(U.S. Dec. 12, 1975) (No. 75-817).

147. Prior to the time a court obtains juirisdiction in a criminal case and is thus
able to issue a gag order, substantial prejudicial publicity may have been released by
the press. See note 159 infra & accompanying text.
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B. Detecting and Avoiding the Effects of Pretrial Publicity: The.
Utility of Peremptory Challenges
The Supreme Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell, realizing that the press
would probably not indulge in self-regulation and that judicially im;
posed regulations on the press would present grave constitutional
issues, delegated the duty of protecting a defendant's fair trial guar,
antee to the trial courts. Regarding the problems encountered in cases
involving pretrial publicity, the Court suggested that a change of venue,
or a continuance of the trial might help to counteract the prejudicial
effects of extensive news coverage. 148 Moreover, the Court determined
that trial courts might exert control over people under its jurisdiction,,
such as prosecutors, defense counsel, the accused, witnesses, police
officers, and court personnel. These people are likely to provide the
press with noteworthy, but sometimes prejudicial, information in the.
pretrial as well as trial stages of the action. 149
Although these suggestions have been and should continue to be
employed in the highly publicized cases, jurists and commentators have
found that the voir dire examination "is one of the chief legal remedieg
available to protect the criminal defendant from the deleterious effects
of press comment .... 1u10 An extensive and probing voir dire assume$
a most important role in criminal trials preceded by a high degree of.
publicity. It represents the final procedure for screening out prejudicial jurors. Moreover, as demonstrated by Dowd and Murphy, the.
voir dire transcript is meticulously scrutinized by appellate courts in
determining whether the defendant received a fair trial.1 5'
As previously discussed, the challenge for cause is the fundamental
device that can be implemented to eliminate partial jurors. Through
questions asked on voir dire, counsel seeks to ascertain the extent of*
148. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966). Subsequent committee reports approved of the increased use of these devices. See, e.g., REARDON REoRT, supra'

note 137, at 119-28 (change of venue); Kaufman Report, supra note 137, at 412 (continuance). However, problems arise in the use of both devices. A change of venue, which,
is within the discretionary powers of the court, may not be effective if publicity is wide-'
spread and need not be granted by the Court. See Comment, supra note 60, at 312.
Although a continuance may be useful, it is difficult to determine how long the continuance should last. Moreover, a prolonged continuance may conflict with a defendant's
right to a speedy trial. See Comment, supra note 60, at 314-15.
149. 384 U.S. at 363. This would conceivably require the use of special orders
which would seek to limit extrajudicial statements of parties, court personnel and wit-'
nesses. See Kaufman Report, supra note 137, at 407-12.
150. Stanga, judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press
Coverage, 13 W. & MARY L. REv. 1, 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Stanga]; ef. Kauf-,
mdin Report, supra note 137, at 413.
151. See notes 97-100 supra & accompanying text.
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prospective jurors' extrajudicial knowledge of the case gained-throughhis. exposure to news reports. If a juror admits to having formed a
preconceived opinion about the defendant's guilt or to having been
exposed to prejudicial publicity, the juror would be subject to a challenge for cause because his state of mind is likely to preclude him from
rendering an impartial verdict based upon the evidence adduced at
trial. 1 52 However, if the juror claims he will not be influenced by his
opinion or impressions, the juror will generally not be excused. The.
test for impartiality which was enunciated in Dowd,153 and recently
reaffirmed in Murphy, 54 has been the guiding principle in New York
State since 1962.155 This test, which generally makes a juror's declaration dispositive of the issue of impartiality, may not adequately protect a defendant in a well-publicized case. "To assert that jurors can
set aside initial impressions formed by pretrial press comment is contrary to the findings of modem research. .... 151
Psychological experiments have shown that one's first impression
of another, if it relates to a central personality trait, "will tend to form
a belief which refuses to yield or change."'1 57 Accordingly, it appears
that the public, believing the media to be a reliable source of information, will form strong beliefs about alleged participants in wellpublicized cases.' 55 Since the published information generally contains incriminating facts relating to the accused, it follows that a belief
in the incriminating facts will "result in the formation of a belief in
his guilt."'159
A potential juror who has been exposed to publicity concerning
a pending trial may be subtly biased against the accused without
realizing it. Since it appears that it is "psychologically impossible"' ' 0
to set aside this predisposition, it is doubtful that the juror will be
able to resolve Teasonable doubts in favor of the accused, even if such
potentially prejudicial doubts were openly admitted. 161
Experiments have shown that pretrial publicity tending to show
the guilt of the accused, such as the publication of a confession, appears to have a devastating effect on the ability of potential jurors to
152. CPL 270.20(1) (b).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See note 102 supra & accompanying text.
95 S. Ct. at 2036.
People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d 412, 225 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1962).
Stanga, supra note 106, at 5.
Comment, supra note 94, at 678.
Id. at 681.

159. Id.
160. Id. at 682.
161. Id. at 683.
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be impartial. 16 2 Moreover, some news accounts which are totally factual
in nature may present vivid descriptions of a brutal and violent offense.
Such accounts may prejudice the juror, even though he may not have
16 3
a conscious opinion about the guilt of the accused.
Psychological data thus make it clear that the latent psychological
effects of pretrial publicity on a juror make it difficult for the juror
to recognize his own bias. Since the juror's opinion of his impartiality
is given great weight in the determination of a challenge for cause, the
question of the effect of publicity on the juror is, to a great extent,
left to the juror. The juror, who may not be cognizant of his prejudice,
thus becomes the primary arbiter of the effect of pretrial publicity.
The difficulty with placing this responsibility with the juror has been
recognized:
[I]t seems unlikely that a prejudiced juror would recognize his own
personal prejudice or knowing it, would admit to it. However, since
there are no empirical data to contradict his declaration of detachment, his word is ordinarily the determining factor.'"
These psychological factors make a challenge for cause premised upon
a juror's bias resulting from prejudicial publicity difficult to substantiate under present judicial doctrines. 6 5
As noted previously, peremptory challenges are considered necessary in the jury selection process to supplement challenges for cause.'0t
Moreover, the reasons justifying the necessity for peremptory challenges
are even more compelling in cases involving extensive pretrial publicity. Obviously, there is a greater potential for bias where the news
media has provided the public with numerous and detailed accounts
162. Tans & Chaffee, Pretrial Publicity and Juror Prejudice, 43 JOURNALISMI Q.
647, 652 (1966).
163. See generally Holberg & Sties, The Effect of Several Types of Pretrial Publicity on the Guilt Attributations of Simulated Jurors, 3 J. APPLIED Soc. Psyvo. 267
(1973).
164. A. FRIENDLY & R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY 103 (1967).
165. In light of this fact, it is felt that the standards for challenges for cause be
reduced. If a juror, who has formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt or has read
prejudicial news reports, declares that he will be impartial, he will generally qualify as a
juror. However, it has been suggested that "[a] prospective juror who has been exposed
to and remembers reports of highly significant information, such as the existence of or
contents of a confession or other incriminating matters that may be inadmissible as evidence... shall be subject to a challenge for cause without regard to his state of mind."
§ 3.4(b). Ostensibly, this would extend
the underlying rationale of Marshall v. United States, i.e., that a juror's knowledge of
inadmissible and prejudicial information necessarily precludes him from being impartial.
See notes 95-96 supra & accompanying text.
166. See notes 59-66 supra & accompanying text.
REARDON REPORT, supra note 137, at pt. IV,
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of a criminal offense, the suspected offender or collaterally related
issues since "[ilt is now unequivocally established that publicity alone
can prevent a fair trial."'167 However, the bias caused by publicity is
difficult to establish because the psychological phenomena responsible
for its existence are not readily demonstrable in a manner cognizable
by a court of law. Thus, the use of peremptory challenges to "eliminate
the extremes of partiality"'16s and to ensure that the jurors try the case
on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, becomes especially
important in cases which have become causes cRl~bres. The tendency
of jurors to be mistaken about their impartiality'6 9 as a result of unconscious biases often created by pretrial publicity and the inherent
difficulties in challenging a juror for cause in highly publicized cases
combine to make an extensive voir dire and the intelligent exercise of
a sufficient number of peremptory challenges necessary in securing
impartial juries in such cases.' 70
It is clear that peremptory challenges serve an important function
in the jury selection process inasmuch as they may be employed to
eliminate potential jurors who are presumably biased but not subject
to a challenge for cause. Since extensive pretrial publicity increases
the potential for biased jurors who may effectively avoid being successfully challenged for cause, an increase in the statutory allocation
of peremptory challenges in such cases would theoretically provide
additional protection for the integrity of the jury selection process.
The court of appeals in State v. King refused to explore the possible
rationale behind Justice King's decision to grant Hill and Pernasilice
10 additional peremptory challenges. It is submitted, however, that in
the case of a criminal trial surrounded by extensive and potentially
prejudicial publicity, there is ample justification for the judicial modification of CPL 270.25. Moreover, the theory underlying the granting
of additional peremptory challenges in well-publicized cases, which is
illustrated by decisions in other jurisdictions, should serve as the basis
for the legislative revision of CPL 270.25.
167. Comment, supranote 60, at 327.
168. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
169. REARDoN REPORT, supra note 137, at 61.

170. For an excellent discussion of the increased awareness of the importance of

peremptory challenges in the jury selection process see Note, Voir Dire: Establishing
Minimum Standards to Facilitate the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges, 27 STAN. L.

Rav. 1493 (1975). The direct relation between the use of peremptory challenges and the
existence of pretrial publicity was parenthetically noted by the Supreme Court in Swain.
380 U.S. at 218 n.24, citing HowAsD,

CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 363

(1931) (the

use of peremptory challenges in England is negligible because of the courts' greater control over pretrial publicity).
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On the federal level, a trial court is expressly given the authority
by statute to increase the number of peremptory challenges available
to multiple defendants. 17 1 This power has been invoked repeatedly
in highly publicized cases. In United States v. Bonanno,1'7 2 for example,
27 joined defendants requested a change of venue or continuance as a
result of pretrial publicity. In denying these motions the trial judge
said:
[t]he practice of voir dire examination of prospective jurors is perhaps
the most important safeguard against prejudiced jurors in the administration of criminal justice .... In order to strengthen its protection
I have decided to award the defense 42 peremptory challenges, which
is 32 more than is required . . . while the government will be held
173
to its 6 challenges.

The practice of granting additional peremptories has not been
limited to multiple-defendant cases. In addition to one of the affidavits submitted by Hill and Pernasilice in King,'7 4 there is documentation of the extended use of peremptory challenges in singledefendant cases inundated with pretrial publicity. In the 1967 Illinois
murder trial of Richard Speck, for example, the lone defendant was
permitted to exercise 160 peremptory challenges as a result of the ex171. FED. R. CiRxi. P. 24(b).
172. 177 F. Supp. 106, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bufalino,
285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
173. 177 F. Supp. at 123 (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Farries, 459
F.2d 1057, 1060 (3rd Cir. 1972); cf. United States v. Fujimoto, 107 F. Supp. 865, 868
(D. Hawaii 1952). Several other jurisdictions which permit the trial court to grant additional peremptory challenges to multiple defendants who must join in this challenge also
permit the additional peremptories to be exercised jointly or separately. See, e.g., FED. R.
CRim. P. 24(b); MD. ANN. CODE vol. 9B, rule 746(2) (1971); Ky. R V. STAT. ANN. vol.
17, rule 9.40 (1972); MINN. STAT. ANN. vol. 27A, rule 26.02 (Supp. 1975) (additional
peremptories may be given to the state); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. vol. 5B, rule 24(b)
(1974). Some states give multiple defendants the same number of peremptory challenges
they would have been entitled to had they been tried separately. See, e.g., MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 234, § 29 (Supp. 1975); MfioH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 768.12, .13 (1968).
Presumably, the joint exercise of peremptory challenges under the single-party rule of
CPL 270.25 is justified in the interests of time, expense and by the fact that codefendants usually have similar interests. Cf. Comment, supra note 64, at 753-55. However,
there are cases in which multiple defendants have adversely related interests. This is
apparently recognized in the federal courts (FED. R. CRia. P. 24(b)) and in Maryland
(M. ANN. CODE vol. 9B, rule 746(2) (1971)), for example, since the trial court may
allow multiple defendants to separately exercise additional peremptory challenges. Thus,
it is submitted that the New York Legislature include in CPL 270.25 a provision similar
to that in the federal and Maryland rules in order to adequately protect multiple defendants who have hostile interests as a result of their defenses or adverse publicity. For
a suggested revision of CPL 270.25 see text at 574.
174. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
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75
tensive and .prejudicial publicity concerning the case.1 Under the
applicable statute, the defendant was only entitled to 20 such chal76

lenges.1

is
Examining Justice King's ruling against this background, it'
clear that the granting of additional peremptory challenges in cases
which have become causes c lbres has been and should continue to 'be
regarded as a supplementary method for protecting the right to afair
and impartial trial. Although the granting of an additional number
of peremptory challenges does not guarantee the impaneling of a
totally unbiased jury, Justice King's ruling should be seen as an earnest
attempt to "prevent even the probability of unfairness"' 177 in the fundamentally important jury selection process.
CONCLUSION

A trial before an impartial jury and the existence of a free press
are fundamentally desirable and constitutionally required in our society. The overzealous and unbridled exercise of the latter constitutional freedom in relation to pending criminal trials may, however,
unconstitutionally impinge upon the former. The apparent undesirability and uncertain constitutional status of the use of prior restraints on the news media has made it incumbent upon trial courts
adjudicating highly publicized cases to utilize other devices at their
disposal which are capable of ameliorating the free-press-fair-trial conflict. In recognition of the unconscious biases often fostered by pretrial publicity and the limited effectiveness of other methods used in
attempting to prevent these biases from tainting a jury trial, the extended use of peremptory challenges is a viable method for protecting
defendants' sixth amendment guarantee. This theory was illustrated
in practice by Justice King's grant of additional peremptory challenges
to the defendants in People v. Hill & Pernasilice.
Hopefully, Justice King's ruling will provide guidance for trial
courts in controversial and well-publicized cases in the future. However, since the merits of Justice King's ruling were not reached by, the
court of appeals in State v. King, and because CPL 270.25 does not
expressly authorize the granting of additional peremptory challenges,
175.
be noted
lation by
176.
177.

People v. Speck, 41 II.2d 177, 213, 242 N...2d 208, 227 (1968). It should
that the state was also given 160 peremptory challenges-the result of a stiputhe parties. Id.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(e) (Smith-Hurd 1970).
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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the effective precedential value of his ruling is limited, Moreover, the
possibility of a reversal of the ruling in People v. Hill & Pernasilice
remains. In order to end the uncertainty regarding the propriety of
Justice King's trial order, it is suggested that GPL 270.25 be amended
to incorporate an express delegation of discretionary power to trial
courts to increase the minimum statutory allocation of peremptory
challenges to single and multiple defendants. The following is offered
as a possible amendment to GPL 270.25:
4. In the interests of justice, the court may grant additional peremptory challenges to the defendant or defendants. The court
may allow the additional peremptory challenges granted to multiple defendants to be exercised jointly or separately.
JOSEPH
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